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Summary 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. Human 
activities all over the world from a multitude of different sectors are 
contributing to global warming. Therefore, climate change law exists on 
many different levels, creating a complex web of interacting legislation. In 
this multi-levelled legal landscape the European Union is attempting green 
leadership. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what legal difficulties the 
European Union may encounter when exercising its leadership. The thesis 
focuses on issues with the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, customary international law and the principle of non-
intervention, the Most Favoured Nation and National Treatment principles 
in World Trade Organization law and issues that might result from the 
European Unions institutional structure.  
 
In order investigate the leadership, its nature must first be explored. The 
European Union has taken many measures to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions. By showing concrete action the European Union wishes to lead 
by example. It is also the expressed ambition of the European Union to 
inspire others to act. This leadership type is classified as directional 
leadership.  
 
However, the European Union has also taken some measures that can be 
classified as unilateral. Unilateral in the sense that they are intended to 
create incentives for, or impose, a certain behaviour of countries outside the 
European Union. The European Union has included aviation in the 
European Union Emission Trading System, banned certain Clean 
Development Mechanism credits, put a sustainability requirement on 
biofuels and is considering including imported products with high carbon 
emission during their production process in the European Union Emission 
Trading System. With these measures, the European Union is trying to take 
on a more aggressive leadership style, using the proverbial stick and carrot. 
This leadership style is called structural leadership. 
 
These two different types of leadership that the European Union is 
attempting encounters different legal obstacles. A directional leadership 
needs a strong and united leader. The European Union, constituting of 27 
different Member States, might not always be perceived as united or 
effective. A structural leadership might encounter problems with World 
Trade Organization law both because it differentiates between products 
based on production processes, and because it is according advantages only 
to countries that have a similar system to the European Union Emission 
Trading System. Furthermore, it could also have difficulties respecting the 
common but differentiated and respective capabilities principle in the 
United Nation Framework Convention Climate Change because of not 
differentiating between developed and developing countries. A possible way 
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to justify its measures under World Trade Organization law would be to fall 
under the exceptions for environmental measures that can be found in article 
XX General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
 
This thesis finds that the European Union has to be cautious when creating 
its measures to respect the requirements that exist on different levels. The 
holistic approach of the European Union to legislate across sectors is a good 
way to approach the problem but problematic from a legal perspective. 
However, considering the gravity of the issue of climate change it is 
conceivable that World Trade Organization law and international law will 
develop to give greater room for climate change measures. 
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Sammanfattning 
En av vår tids största utmaningar är frågan om klimatförändringar. Mänsklig 
aktivitet över hela världen, från en mängd olika källor, bidrar till den 
globala uppvärmningen. Därför återfinns klimatlagstiftning på många olika 
nivåer vilket leder till regelverk som samverkar med varandra på olika plan. 
I detta komplexa juridiska landskap försöker Europeiska Unionen etablera 
ett grönt ledarskap. 
 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka vilka juridiska svårigheter 
Europeiska Unionens ledarskap kan stöta på. Uppsatsens fokus är Förenta 
Nationernas Klimatkonvention, internationell sedvanerätt och non-
interventionsprincipen, Most Favoured Nation och National Treatment 
principerna i Världshandelsorganisationsrätten och problem som kan uppstå 
med Europeiska Unionens institutionella struktur. För att undersöka de 
rättsliga förutsättningarna för Europeiska Unionens ledarskap måste det 
först klargöras vilket ledarskap Europeiska Unionen utövar. 
 
Europeiska Unionen har vidtagit flera åtgärder för att minska sitt utsläpp av 
växthusgaser. Genom att visa på konkreta åtgärder vill Europeiska Unionen 
föregå med gott exempel. Det är också en av Europeiska Unionen uttalad 
ambition att inspirera andra till handling. Denna ledarskapstyp klassificeras 
som ’directional leadership’. 
 
Europeiska Unionen har också vidtagit åtgärder som kan klassificeras som 
unilaterala. Unilaterala i den mening att de är avsedda att skapa incitament, 
eller tvång, för länder utanför Europeiska Unionen att ändra sitt beteende. 
Europeiska Unionen har inkluderat internationellt flyg i Europeiska 
Unionens utsläppshandelssystem, förbjudit vissa Clean Development 
Mechanism krediter, satt ett hållbarhetskrav på biobränslen och överväger 
att inkludera import av produkter vars produktion innebär höga utsläpp i 
Europeiska Unionens utsläppshandelssystem. Med de åtgärderna försöker 
sig Europeiska Unionen på en mer aggressiv ledarstil, med hjälp av piska 
och morot. Denna ledarskapstyp kallas för ’structural leadership’. 
 
De två olika ledarskapsstilar som Europeiska Unionen utövar möter olika 
rättsliga hinder. Ett directional leadership kräver en stark och enad ledare. 
Europeiska Unionen, som utgörs av 27 olika medlemsstater, uppfattas inte 
alltid som enat och effektivt. Ett structural leadership kan få problem med 
Världshandelsorganisationsrätten, eftersom åtgärderna skiljer mellan 
produkter enbart på grund av hur de producerats, samt enbart ger fördelar 
till länder som har ett system som liknar Europeiska Unionens 
utsläppshandelssystem. Dessutom uppstår svårigheter med att respektera 
gemensamma men differentierade och respektive kapaciteter principen i 
Förenta Nationernas Klimatkonvention eftersom åtgärderna inte gör skillnad 
på utvecklade länder och utvecklingsländer. Ett möjligt sätt att försvara 
Europeiska Unionens åtgärder i Världshandelsorganisationsrätten vore om 
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de föll under de undantag för miljöåtgärder som finns i artikel XX General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
 
Denna avhandling konstaterar att Europeiska Unionen måste vara försiktigt 
när det skapar sina åtgärder för att respektera den lagstiftning som återfinns 
på flera olika nivåer. Det holistiska synsättet som Europeiska Unionen 
representerar genom att lagstifta flera olika branscher är ett bra sätt att 
närma sig klimatfrågan, men problematiskt sett ur ett juridiskt perspektiv. 
Med tanke på faran av klimatförändringar är det möjligt att 
Världshandelsorganisationsrätten och internationell rätt kommer att 
utvecklas för att ge större utrymme för klimatåtgärder. 
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1 Introduction  
One of the greatest challenges of our time is the issue of climate change. 
The exact consequences of an increase in temperature are hard to predict, 
but it is clear that there will be consequences. A rise of the sea-level 
threatens as the polar icecaps are melting, many places on earth are in 
danger of becoming inundated. Difficult weather and ravaging storms will 
increase. Heat waves and drought resulting in water shortage is a likely 
scenario.1 According to an overwhelming majority of researchers, the 
increase in temperature and the climate change that will follow is caused by 
human activities. Our emissions of so-called greenhouse gases, such as 
carbon dioxide, are identified as the major reason behind the problem.2 It is 
clear that the issue must be addressed or else we will have to suffer the 
consequences.  
 
Due to the multitude of emission sources, across several sectors, a holistic 
approach is needed when searching for a solution. Finding a solution most 
likely means reconsidering the way we act and live today. A part of the 
challenge is finding new ways to live on the planet, living in a manner that 
is sustainable.  
 
Adding to the complexity is the fact that the damage created by emissions 
does not stay local. Emissions in one part of the world have consequences 
for the entire globe. Emission reductions have a positive effect, not only for 
the reducer but for everyone else as well, making it difficult for sovereign 
States to see the economic benefit of acting.  
 
The problem has been created collectively and the solution resides with 
collective action. Since the origin of the issue lies in the industrial 
revolution, it is the developed part of the word that is responsible for the 
historic emissions. Still, the issue has to be resolved collectively which 
create a difficult situation with the need to balance the rightful demand of 
less-developed nations to develop and the necessity of acting together.  
 
All these issues are expressed in laws governing climate change. Climate 
law exist on the multilateral and transnational level, as well as on the 
regional and local level. The multi-sectoral approach that is necessary 
                                                 
1 IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, 
M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, p 8. 
2 IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, 
M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, p 2. 
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sometimes makes other fields of law, such as international trade law, collide 
with measures against climate change.  
 
Collective action amongst nations is not easy to achieve. Often a leader is 
needed to show the way, and to push and encourage others to follow. The 
EU as a sui generis organisation is attempting a very needed climate 
leadership. A successful leadership by the EU could help provide a global 
solution to this pressing issue.  
 
However, is it legally possible for the EU to manoeuvre in the complex 
legal setting that is climate law? It is in this context I have posed my 
questions. My aim is to take a closer look at the EU leadership and identify 
some of the most important legal obstacles that the EU’s leadership faces. In 
order to answer my questions I must first identify what kind of leadership 
the EU has taken on, and in order to understand the leadership the reasons 
behind it must also be clarified. Then it is possible to answer my question: 
What are the legal obstacles in international law, WTO law and EU law to 
the exercise of the EU’s green leadership on climate mitigation?  
 
My hope is that this thesis and the answer to my question will give an 
indication on how the issue is being addressed today and what role the EU 
may play. It will identify some of the most pressing legal obstacles that 
exists for the EU taking an effective leadership role in the battle against 
climate change. 
1.1 Research Question 
The key question is what are the legal obstacles to the EU’s climate change 
leadership. In order to answer this question I will also have to answer the 
questions: Which are the limits in the EU’s institutional structure and law to 
leadership? What are the legal obstacles to leadership in the UNFCCC, 
international law, in particular with the principle of state sovereignty, the 
non-intervention principle and the duty to cooperate as expressed in the Rio 
declaration and WTO law in particular with the Most Favoured Nation 
principle and the National Treatment principle in the GATT. In order to 
answer these questions an examination of what kind of leadership in 
mitigating climate change the EU seeking is also necessary. 
1.2 Method 
Rules concerning climate change exist not only on the regional and national 
level but also in international and transnational law.3 As pointed out by Kati 
Kulovesi, the transboundary nature of climate change forces different legal 
                                                 
3 Kati Kulovesi, ’Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship: Two Emerging 
Trends’, University of Eastern Finland Deparment of Law, Legal Studies Research Papers, 
Paper No 5 (2012), p 2. 
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systems to interact when addressing the problem.4 This is my starting point; 
how the EU is managing an international leadership in a landscape of legal 
pluralism, and in particular how this puts restrains on the EU’s capacity to 
act. 
 
This thesis does not aspire to give an in-depth analysis of a specific case or 
legal regime, but rather to paint a broader picture of the obstacles to EU 
leadership that can be found in the legal landscape. How different regimes 
interact and depend on each other and affect the possibilities of the EU as a 
leader. In the light of the identified legal restraints, I hope that the reasons 
behind the way the EU shapes its climate policies will become clearer, and 
that it will contribute to a better understanding of how the EU may proceed 
as a global leader. 
 
I am investigating three legal regimes in the light of the EU’s climate 
change leadership. First, the WTO since it is an organisation working for 
trade liberalisation and the EU’s measures such as the EU ETS affect trade. 
Second, international law, partly because WTO law is interpreted in light of 
international law, partly since it could be relevant to the EU’s unilateral 
actions. Third, I am looking at the UNFCCC, which it would have been 
impossible to exclude since it is the international convention currently 
governing climate change.  
 
The results from this investigation will be applied to the models for 
analysing leadership that is used by Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson. 
They identify three different types of leadership: directional which is 
leading by example, structural which is leading by using the stick and carrot 
and idea-based which is leading by introducing the best ideas.5 These 
definitions will be the basis for an analysis of the legal obstacles since the 
different leadership styles will raise different issues.  
 
Environmental law is inherently interdisciplinary.6 My thesis, approaching 
political science, is no exception but I am looking at it from a legal 
perspective. In doing this my thesis can contribute to political science 
analyses since it sets the legal frames within which policy can be developed. 
However, politics and law can never be entirely separated and this is 
something that I have considered in my research and writing. I have used 
the traditional method considering the most important sources in each legal 
regime, but I have also looked at official speeches and articles written by 
political scientists. 
                                                 
4 Kati Kulovesi, ’Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship: Two Emerging 
Trends’, University of Eastern Finland Deparment of Law, Legal Studies Research Papers, 
Paper No 5 (2012), p 3. 
5 Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, ’Climate Change and the European Union’s 
Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?*’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 
48 No 4, (2010). 
6 Elizabeth Fisher, ’Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental 
Law Scholarship’, Journal of Environmental Law, 21:2 (2009), p 225. 
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1.3 Material 
Climate change law is a fast developing discipline and the material used 
needs to be as up-to-date as possible in order to give a just picture of the 
situation. Therefore, articles from academic journals have been an important 
source of information. Since some of the issues in my thesis are disputed it 
has also been important to read different opinions to get a better 
understanding and to form my own ideas.  
  
As my thesis concerns different legal regimes, each regime has their own 
primary sources that must be respected. In the EU, the ECJ’s cases are 
important sources. In the WTO, the AB is not bound by its jurisprudence but 
it remains an important source for understanding the text of the agreements. 
It is also important to look at international customary law to comprehend 
how the WTO agreements should be interpreted.  
 
When analysing the leadership of the EU it is the communications from the 
Commission that I have used. The Commission is often responsible for 
representing the EU internationally, in international organizations and with 
third countries.7 The Commission is also responsible for initiating 
legislation, and it shapes the EU’s agenda by making yearly plans on the 
EU’s priority legislative projects.8 These responsibilities and the fact that 
the Commission has as its purpose to represent the Union is the reason why 
I have chosen to look at the Commissions rhetoric when attempting to 
identify the leadership ambitions of the EU.  
1.4 Structure 
To give my thesis a context, a short introduction to the current international 
climate change regime will be given. This part will also pave the way for a 
greater understanding of how, and why the EU is trying to lead. Since the 
EU actively pursues a new agreement within the frames of the UNFCCC, its 
policy is partly inspired by the mechanisms in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. The purpose of this introduction is not to fully explain the 
international climate change regime, but to point to the aspects that are 
relevant for understanding the EU measures and some of the controversy 
surrounding them.  
 
After this introduction to the relevant parts of the international climate 
change regime, it is possible go on to have a closer look at the EU’s 
leadership. In order to answer my question I must first define what kind of 
leadership the EU is aiming for. It will be argued that it is both directional 
and structural, which are leadership types used by Charles F. Parker and 
Christer Karlsson. Structural leadership is connected with more legal 
obstacles since it involves an attempt to influence behaviour outside the EU. 
                                                 
7 The Treaty on the European Union| [2007], OJ C115/13, article 17. 
8 Paul Craig, Gráinne De Burca, ’EU Law Text, Cases and Materials’, 5th edition, Oxford 
University Press, (2011), p 37. 
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A directional leader is only leading by example, changing its own behaviour 
in order to inspire others to do the same. 
 
Thereafter, to show how the EU is attempting to achieve its goals an 
introduction to the legal measures taken by the EU will follow. The focus 
will be on the measures that could have consequences for parties outside the 
EU. Since all measures mitigating climate change aim at reducing 
greenhouse gases, it is true that they all have consequences for parties 
outside the EU since we all share the same air and atmosphere. The 
measures that I speak of are however different since they create, directly or 
indirectly, obligations and incentives for companies or countries outside the 
EU to change their behaviour or policy. The EU has done this by including 
international aviation in the EU ETS, banning the use of certain CDM 
credits, introducing a sustainability requirement for biofuels also by 
considering including imports in the EU ETS. It is mainly these measures 
that could be challenged by international and WTO law. 
 
An introduction to the EU’s environmental competences and the obstacle to 
leadership they create will follow. It is only within these competences that 
the EU may legally act, therefore they are important to understand in order 
to comprehend how the EU legislates to ensure its leadership. The 
competences are also important because they help explain why the policy 
looks the way it does.  
 
Finally, the major legal obstacles that the EU measures could face will be 
presented. . This part will show the boundaries that exists for the effective 
exercise of the EU’s leadership. It will also explain the possible roads that 
the EU might travel to justify its measures, and it will hopefully answer my 
question. 
1.5 Unilateralism  
This section is intended to define the terms ‘unilateralism,’ and ‘unilateral 
measure/action’ that will be used in the thesis. Unilateralism needs to be 
defined in order to make clear what it implies, and what it does not imply, in 
this thesis.  
 
Unilateralism can be defined as when a State, or in this case the EU, is 
pursuing its international goals without cooperating or negotiating with 
other States.9 Unilateral action has negative connotations but it is not true 
that measures are illegal simply because they are unilateral, nor is 
unilateralism always the worse choice.10 Indeed, unilateralism is a broad 
term which embodies different types of policies, not limited to legal acts. It 
                                                 
9 André Nollkaemper, ’Unilateralism/Multilateralism”, Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 
(2013), p 1. 
10 André Nollkaemper, ’Unilateralism/Multilateralism”, Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 
(2013), p 6. 
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is not the same as unilateral acts of States in international law which 
consists of declarations that are made for the purpose of creating a legal 
effect.11 Unilateralism is, simply put, a term for when a State acts on its own 
in the international arena. 
 
Unilateralism and unilateral action can be used as complements to a 
multilateral approach, because unilateralism and multilateralism are not 
mutually exclusive.12 In fact unilateral action can be, and has historically 
been, used to induce new energy to slow multilateral negotiations and to 
contribute to the effective development of international customary law. 
Concerning environmental issues, trade sanctions as an unilateral action 
could be used as a way to create incentive for multilateral action.13 
Unilateral action can at times, particularly concerning pressing issues such 
as climate change, be preferred to no action. I agree with André 
Nollkaemper that the legality and the correct use of unilateralism must be 
judged in the international context for the decision.14 From my perspective, 
when the EU is pursuing unilateral actions in order to mitigate climate 
change it is for the reasons of pushing multilateral negotiations forward, or 
to solve a problem that can not wait to be solved. My classification of acts 
as unilateral should not mean that they are inherently illegal. 
                                                 
11 André Nollkaemper, ’Unilateralism/Multilateralism”, Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 
(2013), p 1. 
12 André Nollkaemper, ’Unilateralism/Multilateralism”, Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 
(2013), p 2. 
13 André Nollkaemper, ’Unilateralism/Multilateralism”, Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 
(2013), p 5. 
14 André Nollkaemper, ’Unilateralism/Multilateralism”, Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press, 
(2013), p 6. 
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2 International Climate Change 
Regime 
This section is intended to give a brief overview of the international regime 
which currently governs collective action on climate change. Focus is on the 
role of the EU, and on elements which the EU has adopted in its climate 
change policy.  
2.1 UNFCCC 
There is currently a single international legal framework for negotiating 
multilateral climate change mitigation: the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC 
expresses the need for developed countries to limit their emissions to the 
1990’s level.15 From the start there was a multitude of different views on 
how to approach the problem. This was due to economic, social and cultural 
issues that needed, and still need, to be addressed in face of such a complex 
problem as climate change.16 Even so, the UNFCCC was negotiated and 
adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, 1992.  
 
The EU is party to the UNFCCC as a Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation and does not have the right to vote, but it can vote for all its 
Member States if agreed upon.17 The fact that the EU is not recognized as a 
full member to the UNFCCC could be seen as making it more difficult for it 
to lead. It is necessary for the EU to show a united front if it wishes to gain 
credibility as a leader, and if its Member States do not always vote the same 
way it could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. 
2.2 Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC is a negotiated agreement that contains 
binding emission reduction targets for developed countries in its annex B.18 
In the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol the EU grabbed the chance of 
acting as a leader when the U.S., because of domestic political issues, failed 
to take on a leading role.19 The first commitment period of the Kyoto 
                                                 
15 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, 
entered into force 21 March 1994) 38 ILM 849, article 4(2). 
16 Cinnamon P Carlarne, ’Climate Change Law and Policy EU and US Approaches’, 
Oxford University Press (2010), p 6. 
17 Christina Eckes, ’EU Climate Change Policy: A Choice between Justice and 
Environmentalism’, Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 2012-102, 
p 8. 
18 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 32. 
19 Cinnamon P Carlarne, ’Climate Change Law and Policy EU and US Approaches’, 
Oxford University Press (2010), p 8. 
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Protocol ran until 2012 but it has been prolonged until 2020 by the Doha 
amendment.20 At the last held Conference of the Parties (COP 18), the EU 
succeeded in getting through its demand for a roadmap to a new binding 
reduction agreement by 2015, to reach the 2 C° target.21 However, the 
Kyoto Protocol is at the moment the only binding international agreement 
on emission reduction. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol does set out binding reduction targets for the developed 
countries, listed in annex I to the UNFCCC, but it does not state how the 
signatory States should achieve their reductions. Instead, the Kyoto Protocol 
provides for three different mechanism that the signatories may use when 
taking measures against climate change: Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Emission Trading System (ETS).22 
CDM is when an annex I country finance a project reducing emissions in a 
non-developed country and count the emissions reduced towards its own 
reduction target.23 JI is the same as CDM but between two developed 
countries, and with the additional requirement that the emission reduction 
must provide an emission reduction by source or an enhancement of 
removals by sinks.24 ETS makes it possible for countries that reduce more 
then they have to, to sell emission allowances to other parties, thereby 
putting a price on carbon and creating a new carbon market. It is also 
possible for the signatories to create local ETS.25 For the reduction of 
emissions from maritime bunker fuels and aviation, it is specially provided 
that the parties should work towards emission reduction through the ICAO 
and the IMO.26 
 
The international climate change regime is by many considered a failure.27 
Important major emitters, such as the U.S., have not signed the Kyoto 
protocol, and even if the protocol was to be implemented in full the 
reduction of greenhouse gases would not be enough to stop global 
warming.28 Since the conclusion of the UNFCCC, except from the 
agreement on prolonging the Kyoto protocol reached in Doha, no binding 
                                                 
20 Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (adopted 8 December 2012). 
21 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0062/index_en.htm, accessed 2013-03-06. 
22 Erich Vranes, ’Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, 
WTO Law and Legal Theory’, Oxford University Press, (2009), p 375. 
23 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 32, article 12. 
24 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 32, article 6. 
25 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 32, article 17. 
26 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 32, article 2(2). 
27 Paul G Harris, ’Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure’, 
National Resouces Journal, Vol 47 (2007), p 195. 
28 Paul G Harris, ’Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure’, 
National Resouces Journal, Vol 47 (2007), p 197. 
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agreement on concrete emission reductions has been concluded.29 The 
organisations appointed to deal with emissions from bunker fuels, the IMO 
and the ICAO, have so far not taken concrete action to reduce emission.30 
The outcome of the regime so far, in terms of concrete action, is bleak.  
                                                 
29 Daniel C Esty, Anthony L E Moffa, ’Why Climate Change Collective Action has Failed 
and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime’, Journal of 
Internaional Economic Law, Vol 15(3) (2012), p 781. 
30 Kati Kulovesi, ’Adressing Sectoral Emissions outside the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: What Roles for Multilateralism, Minilateralism and 
Unilateralism?’, Review on European Community & International Environmental Law’, 
Vol 21(3) (2012), p 195. 
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3 Leadership of the EU on 
Climate Change Mitigation 
This section will give an introduction to the EU’s climate change policy. It 
will also show which leadership ambition the EU has pronounced, and give 
the main reasons behind this ambition. 
3.1 Climate Change Policy of the EU 
Already in the preamble to the Treaty on European Union the environment 
is mentioned as a subject to promote. Article 3(3) TEU states that the EU 
should work for sustainable development, and promote scientific and 
technological advances. In article 3(5) TEU it is stated that the EU should 
internationally promote the values mentioned in the article, among them  
sustainable development figures once again.31 An addition that came with 
the Lisbon treaty in article 191(1) TFEU is the inclusion of the obligation to 
promote measures internationally in order to combat climate change .32 
Apparently, the environment and climate change is on the EU’s agenda. 
 
The EU’s climate and energy policy is based on three pillars. The first is 
security of energy supply, the second competitiveness of European ‘green’ 
technology and the third sustainability through the increased use of 
renewable energy and greater energy efficiency.33 
 
The actual commitment of the EU is to reduce greenhouse gas emission to 
80-95% compared to the 1990’s emissions by 2050 by the developed 
countries as a group. Furthermore, the EU is committed to a domestic 
reduction to 80% of the 1990’s emissions by the same date, not including 
carbon market offsets.34 In the Kyoto protocol the EU was committed to a 
reduction to 92% of the emission level in 1990.35 In the Doha amendment to 
the Kyoto Protocol the EU is committed to a reduction of 20% from 1990 
emission level, and an added 10% reduction if other developed countries 
follow with similar reduction commitments.36 In fact, the EU committed 
itself to a 20% reduction from the 1990 levels already in 2008.37 The 
                                                 
31 The Treaty on the European Union| [2007], OJ C115/13, article 3. 
32 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2007], OJ C115/47,  article 
191(2). 
33 http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/eu/policy/energy-and-climate-policy/index_en.htm, 
accessed 22 feb -13. 
34 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the , COM(2011) 112 
final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, p 3-4. 
35 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM 32, Annex B. 
36 Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Article 1 amendment to Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
37 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European 
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introduction of a conditioned reduction target is a part of the overall aim of 
the EU to bring other countries to commit to reducing greenhouse gases, 
both by using the carrot and showing its readiness to contribute. 
3.2 Leadership Ambitions of the EU 
The EU has since the beginning of its climate change policy  aimed for an 
international, as well as an internal, leadership role. Its ambition to be a 
leader was pronounced as early as 1980. Already in the beginning, the 
motivation behind becoming a world leader was partially economic. The EU 
wished to beat the U.S. in the race for a leading position in green 
technology.38  
 
The EU has since then taken the lead on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
notably by deciding to take on a 20% reduction on its own in 2008. The 
sixth Environmental Action Program from 2002, which ran until 2012, 
established climate change as a priority for the Unions environmental 
actions.39 In the proposed seventh Environmental Action Program creating a 
carbon-low economy in Europe is priority objective number two.40 It seems 
as the economic reasoning behind the sought leadership remains. In the 
words of the Commission: 
 
This concrete action, sometimes more ambitious than what countries would 
be ready to commit to internationally, is driven to a significant extent also 
by other domestic agendas: to accelerate innovation, increase energy 
security and competitiveness in key growth sectors and reduce air 
pollution.41 
 
The economic gain from reducing air pollution consists of the improved 
health of EU citizens, which would decrease medical costs.42  
 
What perhaps has changed since the start is that the focus is not only on 
providing incentives for the industry to gain a competitive edge in climate-
friendly technology, but also on the issue of energy security.43 The concern 
                                                                                                                            
Parliament, COM(2007) 1 final, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, p 5. 
38 Andrew Jordan, ’Environmental Policy in the European Union’, Earthscan, (2005), p. 
260. 
39 DECISION No 1600/2002/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL 
of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme. 
40 DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits 
of our planet’, COM(2012) 710 final, p 16.  
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the , COM(2011) 112 
final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, p 13. 
42 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the , COM(2011) 112 
final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, p 13 
43 Communication from the Commission, COM(2010) 2020 final, ’EUROPE 2020 A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, p 15. 
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is that rapidly increasing prices on fossil fuels and political tensions between 
the oil-producing countries and the west could become an issue.44 Referring 
to political difficulties likely mean Russia and the Middle East.45  
 
Another reason for the EU’s focus on climate change is the need the EU felt 
to unite the Union citizens around a new issue to regain legitimacy after the 
failure of the constitutional treaty in 2005.46 
 
 Reading these motivations in conjunction with the three pillars of the EU 
climate policy, the aim of EU’s climate action is clear: Energy security, 
competitive advantages and sustainability. It seems clear the EU’s ambitions 
for a leadership is driven by more than environmental concern. An 
important part of its motivation is the wish to take the lead of a new green 
market. A problem that could arise with the economical reason behind its 
climate change mitigation is compliance issues with WTO law. Protectionist 
legislation is not allowed, and the EU has to be careful when creating its 
environmental policy to balance environmental and economic concerns and 
economy to not be perceived as protectionist.  
3.2.1 Leadership Rhetoric of the Commission  
When attempting an analysis of the manner in witch the EU presents itself 
as a leader and how it defines its challenges one thing is clear: the EU has 
the ambition of being an international leader in combating climate change.47 
Here, three core ideas expressed by the Commission are presented. These 
three themes are recurrent in the Commissions communications.  
3.2.1.1 Leading by Example 
According to the Commission the EU should lead by example, bringing 
other countries on board by showing that effective measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions are possible.48 The EU has leadership on 
                                                 
44 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 
2 final, ’Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius. The way ahead for 2020 and 
beyond’, p 2-5. 
45  Sebastian Oberthür & Claire Roche Kelly, EU Leadership in International Climate 
Policy: Achievements and Challenges, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of 
International Affairs, 43:3, (2008), p 43. 
46 Erkki J Hollo, Kati Kulovesi, Michael Mehlin (eds), ’Climate Change and the Law’, 
Springer Netherlands (2013) p 515-516. 
47 As formulated in Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, COM(2010) 86, ’International climate policy post-Copenhagen: Acting now to 
reinvigorate global action on climate change’, 
 p 8. and Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
COM(2005) 35 final, ’Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change’, p 11.  
48 SPEECH/10/468 Europe's view on International Climate Policy, 20 September 2011, p 8. 
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inventive solutions to climate issues. The way that the EU leads is by taking 
domestic action to reduce emissions.49  
 
The EU is set on becoming the most climate friendly region in the world, in 
this way the EU intends to show its commitment to concrete action and get 
others to act.50 The “EU example” often refers to the commitment by the EU 
to a 20% reduction below the 1990 levels that the EU made before the 
Kyoto Protocol.51 It also refers to the many legally binding measures that 
the EU has implemented.52 
 
The way in which the EU is exercising its leadership is by showing concrete 
action, meaning measures that can have an actual effect of reducing 
emissions.53 Thus, the EU paints a picture of itself as a very active actor and 
a good example of how reducing emissions could be achieved. The 
emphasis is on ‘bringing other onboard’ through showing ‘concrete action.’ 
This image of the EU is justified, the EU has enacted many climate change 
laws across different fields. An overview of the EU’s climate change 
legislation which shows its ambition is included in supplement A. 
3.2.1.2 Achieving a Legally Binding Deal and Getting 
Others to Commit 
There is a clear idea of the EU that its leadership on climate issues is 
necessary to move international negotiations on a legally binding deal 
forward.54 Concrete action and a legally binding international climate deal is 
what the EU wishes to achieve with its leadership.55 The role that the EU 
should take internationally is to continue to work for an international 
agreement.56  
                                                 
49 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 
2 final, ’Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius. The way ahead for 2020 and 
beyond’, p 2. 
50 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 
86, ’International climate policy post-Copenhagen: Acting now to reinvigorate global 
action on climate change’, p 8. 
51 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the Regions, COM(2009) 
39 final, ’Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen’, p 2. 
52 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 
112 final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050.’ 
53 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 
86, ’International climate policy post-Copenhagen: Acting now to reinvigorate global 
action on climate change’, p 8.  
54 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European 
Parliament, COM(2007) 1 final, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, p 15. 
55 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the , COM(2011) 112 
final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, p 13. 
56 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 
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Clearly one of the major purposes of the EU’s leadership is to push through 
a new binding deal after the Kyoto Protocol. This is closely related to the 
realisation that no real change can be achieved if the EU acts alone. 
 
The EU stresses the importance of global action, the problem of global 
warming cannot be solved by the EU alone.57 The EU needs to continue to 
motivate third countries to follow the EU example.58 Other actors should 
aim to achieve the EU’s level of commitment and it is an important part of 
the EU’s leadership to promote this.59  
 
In the attempt to create an incentive for third countries to match the EU 
measures the EU is also prepared to take the lead by unilaterally putting a 
price on carbon, for instance by including imports in the EU ETS. This 
strategy aims to solve the risk of carbon leakage when the EU is the only 
one taking measures to reduce emissions.60  
 
The overall aim of the EU’s measures is to persuade other states to 
implement the same standards as the EU.61 This is important to the EU since 
it is the only possible way to reach the goal of only a 2 C° increase in 
temperature.  
 
Another, not less important, reason is the economic loss the EU would face 
being the only one mitigating a common problem. The fear of ending up 
with a competitive disadvantage is pushing the EU to take a more active 
leadership role, for example by unilaterally putting a price on carbon. 
3.2.1.3 Leading the Third Industrial Revolution 
Another way that the EU leads is by being a leader of the third industrial 
revolution.62 Already in 2007 the commission claimed that the way forward 
for the EU was to “set the pace” for the new global industrial revolution.63  
                                                                                                                            
86, ’International climate policy post-Copenhagen: Acting now to reinvigorate global 
action on climate change’, p 2. 
57  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 
885 final, ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’, p 9.  
58 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 
112 final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, p 13. 
59 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 
112 final, ‘A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050’, p. 9.  
60 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee an the Committee of the Regions, COM(2010) 
265 final, ‘Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions 
and assessing the risk of carbon leakage’, p 11. 
61 R Daniel Kelemen, ’Globalizing EU Environmental Regulation’, Princeton annual 
Workshop on European Integration, (1 May 2009). 
62 SPEECH/12/263 Statement by Barroso at the press point with UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon following the opening ceremony of the EU Sustainable Energy For all Summit 16 
april 2012, p 2. 
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The third industrial revolution refers to a concept developed by Jeremy 
Rifkin, very simplified the third industrial revolution would mean moving 
away from carbon energy use towards renewable energy because of the 
threat of global warming. This would be done by using new green 
technology and internet technology.64  
 
In the reasoning around the third industrial revolution the economic reasons 
behind being a green leader shines through. If the EU would be the biggest 
and best at green technology it would have a big economic advantage in a 
future with increased demands for environmentally-friendly technology, and 
less access to fossil fuels. 
 
                                                                                                                            
63 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European 
Parliament, COM(2007) 1 final, ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’, p 20 
64 Jeremy Rifkin, ’the third industrial revolution’, Engineering & Technology (26 april - 9 
may 2008), p 27. 
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4 Analysis of the EU’s 
Leadership 
In this section an analysis of the EU’s leadership will be conducted, which 
will serve as a base for further discussion about the legal obstacles it may 
face. As a method for analysing the EU’s leadership, I will borrow the 
models that Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson use in their article. 
They will serve as a good starting point for a discussion about the legal 
restraints the different leadership styles might entail. 
 
Structural leadership is leading with a stick and carrot. Structural leadership 
can be used by a strong actor that has the power both to coerce and to create 
incentives. In order for a structural leadership to be effective, it is necessary 
that the threats are serious and that the incentives are attractive enough to 
motivate a change in behaviour.65 
 
Directional leadership is the idea of leading by example. Through taking 
concrete action for others to follow, the directional leader inspires others to 
act by showing how it can be done. The directional leader takes the first 
move and needs to make others feel confident that functional action is being 
taken, so that others may follow without the risk of gaining a competitive 
disadvantage.66 
 
Idea-based leadership is an intellectual leadership whereby the leader tries 
to set policy agendas and find solutions to common problems. The idea-
based leader tries to identify the problem and the solutions. Idea–based 
leadership depends on the capacity of showing others a new perspective on 
a certain issue. This new perspective will show the advantages of following 
the suggestions of the idea-based leader.67 
 
A first prerequisite for being able to be a leader is to be able to act, and thus 
being an actor. The EU, being a sui generis institution, could not be 
categorized as an actor according to any established ideas.68 The EU has 
made attempts of clarifying its role internationally. Amongst other things, 
the Lisbon treaty accorded the EU with legal personality. New rules on how 
to negotiate and conclude international agreement should also help clarify 
                                                 
65 Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, ’Climate Change and the European Union’s 
Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?*’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 
48 No 4, (2010), p 926-927. 
66 Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, ’Climate Change and the European Union’s 
Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?*’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 
48 No 4, (2010), p 926-927. 
67 Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, ’Climate Change and the European Union’s 
Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?*’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 
48 No 4, (2010), p 926-927. 
68 Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, ’Climate Change and the European Union’s 
Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?*’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 
48 No 4, (2010), p 925. 
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the role of the Union. Although the exact nature of the EU’s position as an 
actor is difficult to determine, the EU has in several ways been accepted by 
the international community as an actor capable of participating in 
international negotiations.  
4.1 Directional Leadership of the EU 
Looking at the rhetoric of the Commission described above, directional 
leadership directly comes to mind. Repeatedly, there is a confirmation that 
the EU should lead by example and bring other countries to act through 
showing that concrete domestic measures are taken. The EU has also shown 
its commitment by taking on ambitious reduction targets. By becoming the 
most climate friendly region in the world the EU intends to show the way 
for others. In the spirit of leading by example, the EU has indeed 
implemented many legally binding measures with an aim of limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. 
 
An ambition of the EU is to be an important player in the design of an 
international agreement on climate change. Overall, the EU has strived 
towards shaping international law through taking domestic action.69 It seems 
clear that the EU, in its rhetoric, is attempting a directional leadership.  
 
Many scholars agree that EU is mainly taking on a directional leadership.70 
As we will see, there was a big legislative boost in 2009. This was the year 
of the adoption of the ambitious ‘Climate and Energy Package’, and not 
coincidentally the year of the UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen (COP15). In order to take on a directional leadership it is 
important to show that concrete measures are being taken domestically, 
realising this the EU speedily adopted a broad spectrum of measures in 
order to show its commitment to reducing greenhouse gases. A successful 
meeting in Copenhagen, resulting in a binding document on emission 
reductions, was a high priority target for the EU. The failure of the meeting 
was a great loss of prestige for the Union.71 For directional leadership to be 
successful it is imperative to show effective action. 
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The EU continues, despite the relative failure of the Copenhagen meeting, to 
show that it is serious about a climate friendly Europe. In 2010 a new 
Directorat General (DG) was created at the Commission. It deals 
exclusively with climate change, bringing measures that earlier were spread 
over several DG’s under one umbrella.72 The EU’s continued ambition is to 
carry on a directional leadership, leading by example. 
4.2 Structural Leadership of the EU 
It can however be argued that the EU is not only engaging in a directional 
leadership but also in a structural leadership.73 The rhetoric of the 
Commission points towards a directional leadership, however it also 
expresses an ambition to promote ‘EU solutions’ and ‘EU standards’, and 
that incentives should be created to push the EU’s perspective on climate 
change, which points towards structural leadership.  
 
It should be clear that the EU is capable of exercising a structural 
leadership. By being the largest market in the world, with a significant 
industry, the EU certainly has muscles to put behind its threats.74 However 
the way the EU’s structural leadership can be identified is mainly through 
looking at the implications for third countries of some of the EU measures 
against climate change. The main way in which the EU is engaging in a 
structural leadership is through what could be called unilateral action. 
 
Multilateral action and reaching a common deal on reducing greenhouse 
gases is a goal for the EU that is enshrined in its constitutional treaty: ‘It 
shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in 
the framework of the United Nations.’75 International negotiations are 
important to the EU and, as described above, the EU has shown its 
commitment to leading by example and to reaching a deal within the 
framework of the UNFCCC.  
 
However, negotiations are slow and the result of the Copenhagen meeting 
was a disappointment for the EU that was pushing for a new legally binding 
deal. It has been argued that at the perspective of failure of international 
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negotiations the EU started to enact measures unilaterally to push the 
negotiations forward, thus engaging in a structural leadership.76  
 
Another reason behind this shift towards a structural leadership and 
unilateral action is the potential risk for the EU of ending up with a 
competitive disadvantage, being the only one regulating its industry.77 The 
issue is that climate action always benefits everyone, not only the ones 
paying for the measure. In that way, the ones taking action will be the losers 
and the others the free-riders.78 There are two ways out of this prisoner’s 
dilemma, one would be to reach a legally binding deal, a contract stating 
each parties obligations. The other would be creating a situation where the 
free-riders would be forced to pay for the measures taken by others.79  
 
The EU is aware of this possibility. In a communication, the Commission 
discusses the economic risks of a continued lack of action by other 
industrialised countries, and underlined that the EU needs to continue to 
‘push and encourage’ others to follow.80 The Commission has identified the 
issue as ‘carbon leakage,’ which in fact consists of two problems. One is 
that restrictions on the domestic industry, that are unmatched 
internationally, will make carbon-intensive industries move their production 
outside the EU, thus limiting the positive effects of the measure since the 
source of emission would just have moved, not disappeared. The other 
problem is that the domestic industry will lose their competitive edge, which 
will have negative effects on European economy and employment.81  
 
As an answer to the lack of international action the EU is moving towards 
structural leadership.82  For instance, a suggested solution to carbon leakage 
is including imports in the EU ETS in a similar way that aviation has been 
included.83 The unilateral decision of banning certain CDM credits, is 
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another decision that is likely to ascertain the structural leadership role of 
the EU since it will have a real effect on what kind of projects that are 
pursued internationally in favour of projects accepted by the EU.84  
 
Another clear example of structural leadership is the inclusion of aviation in 
the EU ETS. The EU Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard 
commented in a memo: 
 
‘On the contrary, our regulatory scheme was adopted after having waited 
many years for ICAO to progress. Now it seems that because of some 
countries' dislike of our scheme many countries are prepared to move in 
ICAO, and even to move towards a Market Based Mechanism (MBM) at 
global level.’85  
 
Her statement acknowledges that the EU is successfully pursuing a 
structural leadership. In the same memo she continues with another ‘threat’ 
in order to push for international change: ‘But let me be very clear: if this 
exercise does not deliver – and I hope it does, then needless to say we are 
back to where we are today with the EU ETS. Automatically.’86 
 
What we can see here is that the pursuit of an international agreement is not 
only done through implementing internal measures in order to inspire others 
to follow, but also through creating real consequences for third countries to 
push them to negotiate and act. In a way, the EU is pursuing an international 
agreement, at the same time as it is making sure that it is not alone in paying 
for emissions. Using a combination of directional and structural leadership 
may well be an effective way to push the EU agenda forward, but it is 
legally more difficult to exercise structural leadership that includes 
regulations which have effects on States outside the Union. 
 
The EU is, traditionally, a directional leader, showing the path for others to 
follow. However, recent measures, such as the inclusion of international 
aviation in the EU ETS, the banning of certain CDM credits, the enactment 
of a sustainability requirement, suggests that the EU is also pursuing 
structural leadership. 
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5 EU Measures to Battle 
Climate Change 
In this section the legal measures taken by the EU to mitigate climate 
change will be presented. It is intended to give an overview of how, and in 
what areas, the EU legislates. Understanding the legal structure of the 
measures used by the EU in ensuring its leadership is necessary in order to 
evaluate what legal obstacles they may encounter. A table of the measures 
the EU has taken is included in supplement A. It should be used as a quick 
overview of the many different sectors in which the EU has taken action 
against climate change. 
 
The framework within which the EU takes measures in the area of climate 
change is the European Climate Change Program (ECCP). The ECCP was 
created as a strategy for implementing the Kyoto protocol once signed. The 
program has different working groups which work on specific themes, for 
instance transport, in order to deliver a final report.87 The final report 
functions as the basis for the legal and policy measures that the Commission 
proposes.88  
 
The distinction between internal measures and measures with external 
effects cannot rigidly be upheld since legislative measures might be 
essentially internal, with only exceptional external effects. The distinction is 
rather intended to correspond to directional and structural leadership to help 
the reader. 
5.1 Internal Measures 
In 2009 the Council adopted the climate-energy legislative package in order 
to achieve the 2020 goals.89 The package was also part of an EU strategy to 
show concrete action before the Copenhagen (COP15) meeting, and to 
strengthen its leadership position before the meeting.90 Due to the 
environmental integration principle climate change concerns are also 
integrated in many legislative acts whose main focus is not the environment.  
 
                                                 
87 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
COM(2000) 88 final, ‘on EU policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: 
Towards a European Climate Change Program (ECCP)’, Annex 2 p 8. 
88 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
COM(2000) 88 final, ‘on EU policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: 
Towards a European Climate Change Program (ECCP)’, Annex 2 p 9. 
89 The Council of the European Union,’Council adopts climate-energy legislative package’, 
8434/09 (Presse 77), Brussels 6 April 2009, p 1. 
90 Kati Kulovesi, Elisa Morgera, Miquel Munoz, ’ ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION 
AND MULTI-FACETED INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EU LAW: 
UNPACKING THE EU’S 2009 CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE’, Common Market 
Law Review, 48 (2011), p 830. 
 32 
 
The EU has regulated both on fuels and on emission standards for new 
vehicles. Regulating transport is important since it is one of the main 
contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. In the long run, Europe will only 
have cars fulfilling a certain environmental standard. Measures also include 
labelling, so that consumers can take an active choice when buying cars.91  
 
The construction industry is also facing big changes, by 2020 all new 
buildings should be nearly-zero buildings. Meaning that they should have 
almost no energy consumption. Important measures on limiting the use of 
fluorinated gases, which are very dangerous for the ozone layer, have been 
enacted as well as a strategy for maintaining good air quality in the Union.92  
 
The measures taken by the EU concerns a wide range of areas from 
transport to the possibility of geological carbon storage. This suggest that 
the EU is taking a holistic approach to climate change mitigation, 
integrating it into different areas. As a response to the complexity of the 
issue of climate change it is positive, but it opens up for clashes between 
different legal regimes. For instance the clash between trade law and 
environmental protection. All the legislative acts are addressed to the 
Member States and the industry, but looking closely some of them contain 
elements that also have an external effect. 
5.2 Measures with External Effects 
Turning to the measures with external effects, that is, measures that have an 
effect on the behaviour of companies or States outside the Union, the most 
significant measure is the EU ETS. The EU ETS is often referred to as the 
“flagship policy”93 or the “key instrument”94 for climate change mitigation 
in the EU. The EU ETS is certainly the most ambitious piece of legislative 
work the EU has introduced in combating climate change. It is also a 
legislative piece intended to combat climate change internationally.95 The 
ambition of the EU is for the EU ETS to be “the pillar of the future carbon 
market”.96  
 
The EU ETS is directed to a large number of sectors and several greenhouse 
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gases, as listed in annexes I and II of the directive.97 The EU ETS is a cap-
and-trade system which works by putting a price on carbon, and it has 
created the worlds largest carbon market. All emitters in the sectors 
included must give up allowance corresponding to their yearly emissions. If 
the emitter has emitted more than its yearly allowances it must purchase 
more, or pay a penalty sum of 100€ per allowance. If the emitter has emitted 
less, it can sell its excess allowances on the established carbon market. The 
allowances are distributed according to a national allocation plan that the 
Member State decides on individually. Some of the allowances are given 
away for free and others are auctioned out.98 
 
The EU ETS is implemented in phases, the third face running between 
2013-2020. During this face, there will be an increase in auctioning over 
free distribution of allowances, and the allocation of allowances will be 
centralised to a EU wide cap. The EU ETS is linked to the CDM and JI 
projects under the Kyoto protocol.99 
 
Recently, the EU has put higher demands on which CDM credits that can be 
used in the EU ETS. It no longer accepts carbon credits from projects 
concerning nuclear energy, afforestation or reforestation, and project 
concerning the destruction of industrial gases.100 Banning the use of these 
CDM credits is a unilateral measure taken by the EU in order to avoid 
projects abroad with an undesirable effect on the climate.101 Since the EU 
constitutes the worlds largest carbon market, it is likely that a decreased 
demand for credits from these projects will have real effects on behaviour 
outside the EU.102 
 
The perhaps most controversial part of the EU ETS, in terms of internal 
measures with external effects, is the inclusion of international aviation in 
the EU ETS.103 All aircrafts that land in, or depart from, a Member State are 
included and they have to account for emissions during their entire flight, 
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including emissions in airspace over third states or the high seas.104 There is 
a possibility to exempt aircrafts departing from a third country, if the 
country has taken action similar to the EU ETS to reduce greenhouse gases 
from flights.  
 
The inclusion of aviation into the EU ETS is not intended to replace or halt 
an international agreement on aviation emissions, and might be revised in 
light of such an agreement.105 However, the EU believes that the EU ETS 
could serve as a model for an international agreement on emissions from 
aviations.106  
 
After strong international reactions to the directive, the EU decided to stop 
the inclusion of international aviation for a year until the ICAO general 
conference in September/October 2013 in order to give time for 
international negotiations on a global agreement.107 In this way, the EU is 
trying to push international negotiations forward by taking unilateral action 
on international aviation emissions. It is clear that the EU ETS is intended 
as an example for the world to follow, strengthening both structural and 
directional leadership of the EU. In this case, the EU is using unilateral 
action both to resolve an issue that needs immediate attention and as a mean 
to push international negotiations. 
 
Another area that might be included in the EU ETS in the future is maritime 
shipping, if the IMO does not conclude an agreement on reduction targets 
for maritime bunker fuels.108 The usage of market based mechanisms, such 
as an ETS, is currently under discussion in the IMO. The next meeting 
discussing it will be held between the 13 and 17 May, 2013.109 It is likely 
that the EU will wait for the outcome of the discussion in the IMO before 
taking action. 
 
The possibility of introducing a carbon equalization system is mentioned as 
a way of addressing the issue of carbon leakage. A carbon equalization 
system would make importers surrender allowances for the carbon 
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emissions during production, in a similar way to domestic producers. The 
external implications of such a system are considered by the EU, and there 
is awareness of the need to comply with both the UNFCCC and WTO 
rules.110  
 
Another measure taken by the EU that has extraterritorial effects is the 
sustainability requirement on biofuels included in the Renewable Directive. 
The criteria requires that biofuels should not be produced in areas that have 
been deforested or from raw materials from tropical forest, drained peatland, 
wetland or areas with high biodiversity. In addition, the greenhouse gas 
savings from new plants must be at least 35% compared to fossil fuels, the 
percentage will gradually increase to 60% in 2018. Only biofuels that fulfil 
the sustainability requirement can be counted towards emission targets by 
European companies, and it is likely that they will have a competitive 
advantage on the European market because of this.111  
 
The reason behind the legislation is the ongoing debate on how 
environmentally friendly biofuels really are. It has been said that the use of 
biofuels could result in either a 60% decrease in emissions compared to 
fossil fuels or at worst a 20% increase.112 Since biofuels grow better in 
tropical regions, the main production of biofuels occurs outside the EU.113 
The effects of the directive on countries outside the EU is recognised by the 
EU and considered positive as it implements Union environmental standards 
internationally.114 
 
While reviewing the EU’s legislative work, it is important to remember that 
even though important legislation is in place, it is still up to the Member 
States to implement it in order for it to have any effect. The ambition to 
fight climate change varies between different Member States, and not all 
share the ambitions of the Commission, especially in a time of economic 
instability. This could lead to an uneven implementation of the Unions 
measures.115 The lack of a coherent implementation of the EU’s measures 
against climate change could undermine the sought leadership role of the 
Union, since it undermines its credibility and capacity to act. It would also 
make it more difficult for the EU to put demands on other countries to 
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comply with EU standards when its own Member States fail to do so. 
 
 37 
6 EU Competences and 
Obstacles to the EU’s 
Leadership 
This section attempts to explain what competences the EU possesses to act 
in the environmental field, and specifically on climate change. This section 
is important because in order to understand the measures taken by the EU in 
relation to climate change, it is essential to understand the competences the 
EU has to create those measures. It is also important in order to understand 
the obstacles that exists in the treaties to EU green leadership.  
 
The basic rule expressed in article 5 TEU states that the EU can only act 
within the powers conferred on it by the treaties.116 Therefore, the 
delimitation of the EU’s competences must be made before the legality of 
the measures can be examined.  
 
The treaties require the promotion of climate change mitigation and 
sustainable development, domestically and internationally. This puts an 
obligation on the Commission to formulate an external and internal climate 
change policy, within its conferred powers.  
6.1 Internal Competences  
The EU competences on environment and energy are, according to article 
4(e)(i) TFEU, shared.117 This means that both the EU and its Member States 
have the right to legislate on the matter.118 The Member States have the 
right to legislate as long as the EU has not exercised its right to legislate, 
thus pre-empting the possibility for Member States to legislate. The Member 
States can regain the right to legislate, if the EU ceases to exercise its 
competence. 
 
To define the exact scope of the EU competence to legislate on a particular 
matter, it is necessary to look at the relevant treaty provision establishing 
that specific competence.119 In the case of the environment, the relevant 
treaty provisions are 191-192 TFEU.120 Some of the treaty articles that 
provide the EU with competences to act are broadly formulated and open up 
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for interpretation. In these cases, the ECJ has been inclined to allow for a 
wide interpretation of the competences.121  
 
Another possibility for the EU to gain more competences is the doctrine of 
implied powers. Existing powers can imply the existence of another power 
that is reasonably necessary to be able to exercise the former. A wider 
understanding of implied powers allows for powers that are reasonably 
necessary to achieve a given objective.122 This opens up for possibilities for 
the EU to exercise powers beyond what is expressly stated in the treatise. 
 
The competences in the field of the environment are found under Title XX 
in the TFEU. In article 191(1) TFEU the environmental objectives of the EU 
are listed. In the Lisbon Treaty a new objective was added in relation to 
climate change: ‘promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating 
climate change.’ According to article 191(2) TFEU, the EU should consider 
the precautionary principle, the preventive principle and the polluter pays 
principle when creating its policy. When forming its environmental policy, 
the EU should take into account both scientific environmental data and the 
possible economic cost of its action or inaction, as stated in article 191(3) 
TFEU. Finally, in article 191(4) TFEU it is made clear that to achieve its 
objectives the EU and its Member States, each within their competence, 
should cooperate with third countries or international organisations. The 
competence to conclude agreements that the EU is given is however limited 
as it does not hinder Member States from negotiating and concluding 
international agreements.123 From an exterior perspective this could create 
some confusion as to with whom to negotiate, and this lack of clarity could 
weaken the image of the EU as a strong, united leader.  
 
It is article 192(1) TFEU which is the normal legal basis for legislative acts 
trying to attain the objectives stated article 191 TFEU.124 Article 192(1) 
TFEU prescribes the ordinary legislative process for measures on the 
environment. However, there are  important exceptions from this rule. 
According to 192(2) TFEU, the council must unanimously adopt measures 
affecting fiscal matters, town and country planning, water management, 
land use minus waste management and the choice of energy sources and 
supply.125  
 
The requirement for unanimity makes it difficult to legislate, and it could 
explain why the EU’s environmental policy does not contain certain 
elements, such as a carbon tax. It would also explain why it is difficult for 
the EU to address the energy sector efficiently, a sector that is an important 
source of greenhouse gas emissions. This difficulties could affect how the 
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EU is perceived internationally. If the EU fails to effectively address the 
energy sector its image as a directional leader could be weakened.  
 
Another important treaty provision is article 11 TFEU, which contains the 
environmental integration principle. According to the article, environmental 
concern should be integrated into all other policies. This article gives the EU 
the possibility to take policy decisions in areas outside the environmental 
field which are based on the environmental objectives described in article 
191 TFEU.126 With the integration principle, the EU has a tool for creating 
more coherent responses to complex issues such as global warming where 
measures needs to be taken across different fields to be effective. This 
would strengthen the image of the EU as a strong actor and a directional 
leader.  
 
Where a competence exists it is limited in its exercise by the principle of 
subsidiarity, and the principle of proportionality.127 The principle of 
subsidiarity says that action in a field where the EU does not have exclusive 
competences should be taken at EU level only if the objective is better 
achieved there. The proportionality principle says that the measure taken 
should not to go beyond, in form or in content, what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives in the Treaties.128 Concerning climate change it would, in 
most cases, be easy to motivate action at EU level since the nature of the 
issue is global rather then local. The principle of subsidiarity could however 
put limits on the EU’s leadership, since the EU does not always hold the 
right to act and not on all subjects. Thus weakening its image as an effective 
actor. 
6.2 External Competences 
In order to examine the EU’s ambition of being an international leader in 
fighting climate change it is important not only to understand the internal 
competences it has to act, but also the legal frames within which the EU 
may act internationally. In the previous section the internal competences of 
the EU has briefly been described. Here, a description of the external 
competences of the EU will follow. 
 
In the TFEU external powers are given the EU that allows it to, within its 
competences, conclude international agreements if provided for in the 
treaties, as stated in article 216(1) TFEU. As mentioned above, article 
191(4) TFEU grants the EU the power to conclude international agreements. 
Article 216(1) TFEU also says that the EU can enter into an international 
agreement ‘… where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to 
achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives 
referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act, 
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or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.’129 
 
It is however not solely on the basis of 191(4) TFEU that the EU can enter 
into international agreements. In Opinion 2/00 on the proper legal basis for 
concluding the Cartagena Protocol, the ECJ made it clear that the 
conclusion of international agreements can have 192(1) TFEU as legal basis 
if they do not merely concern cooperation, since the competence to 
conclude agreements on cooperation is specifically provided for in article 
191(4) TFEU.130 The result is that the EU can rely on article 192(1) TFEU 
when concluding international environmental agreements, if they do not 
deal exclusively with cooperation. This decision has broadened the EU’s 
competences. 
 
Article 3(2) TFEU determines when the EU has exclusive competence to 
conclude an international agreement, even if it does not have exclusive 
internal competences in the area that the agreement concerns.131 When the 
conclusion of the agreement is necessary for the EU to exercise its internal 
competences the EU has the exclusive competences to conclude the 
agreement even if the internal competences are shared. This is in fact a 
codification of earlier case law on implied powers.132 
 
Due to the shared competences to conclude international environmental 
agreements, mixed agreements are often concluded. A mixed agreement is 
the joint participation of the EU and the Member States to a treaty.133 The 
conclusion of mixed agreements is not a form provided for in the treaties, it 
has developed in order for the EU and its Member States to be able to act 
within their shared competences without having to delimit them. Mixed 
agreements have been considered a hindrance to a clear and unified EU 
policy on the environment, standing in the way of the EU exercising its 
normative power.134 
 
With the introduction of the Lisbon treaty the process for negotiating 
international agreement was codified in article 218 TFEU. This made the 
negotiation and decision process more clear, and might create a more 
efficient and predictable image of the EU in international negotiations.135 
Efficiency and predictability are important qualities for the EU’s directional 
leadership. 
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We should remember that article 11 TFEU is relevant also for external 
policies, meaning that environmental considerations could be taken in an 
area where the EU has exclusive competences, such as trade. Much of the 
power the EU has is connected to its position as an important trading 
partner. The fact the EU may incorporate environmental concerns into its 
trade policy opens up for the EU to use its economic power to push for 
environmental change abroad. The article grants the EU power to push its 
environmental policy internationally. It is also here that the EU risks facing 
legal problems, when it is integrating environmental concern into trade 
measures. Trade measures have to be compatible with WTO law, and there 
is limited room for environmental concerns in the WTO rules. 
 
The institutional frames are important in order to understand the policy 
decisions of the EU. The limits they put on the EU could affect how the EU 
is considered internationally, and possibly make it more difficult for the 
Union to assume directional leadership. 
6.2.1 Legal Personality of the EU 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty the European Community was 
replaced by the European Union and gained legal personality.136 Article 47 
TEU simply states that the EU should have legal personality.137  
 
The emergence of legal personality for the EU has as a consequence that 
only the EU is entitled to conclude international agreements within its 
competences, the Member States retain the capability of concluding 
international agreements within their competences.138 International 
agreements that the EU has concluded is binding on the EU and its Member 
States.139  
 
The ECJ has also concluded that the EU is bound by customary 
international law.140 When exercising its leadership the EU is therefore not 
only bound by its establishing treaties, but also by international agreements 
to which it is signatory and international legal norms.  
 
It is within these frames that an analysis of the legal possibilities of the 
green leadership of the EU on climate change mitigation must be made. As 
we can see, it is not enough to describe the boundaries for measures that the 
EU treaties presents, its measures also have to be compatible with 
international law. 
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7 Legal Restraints on EU  
Leadership 
In the following section the legal boundaries for the EU’s leadership will be 
presented. This presentation will be based on the type of measures that the 
EU has already taken, or is considering to take, and conflicts that may arise 
with their legality. Starting with limitations that might be found in EU law, 
the thesis will go on to investigate obstacles in international law and treaty 
law. 
7.1 Domestically  
In the EU it is only the Court that has the right to declare an EU legal act 
invalid. It is therefore not strange that the internal justification of EU’s 
unilateral actions was pronounced by the ECJ in a case concerning the 
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS.141 
 
Regarding the legitimacy of EU action on a matter that should have been 
addressed by an international agreement, but where no international action 
has been taken, the ECJ concluded that the mere presence of a pronounced 
international ambition on resolving the issue is enough to give the EU a 
right to act on it. Furthermore, the Court made it clear that the exercise of 
the environmental competences can legitimately put conditions on 
commercial activities in the Union.142 The right for the EU to take action on 
an issue that, according to international agreements, should be resolved 
multilaterally is based on the failure of the international community to do 
so. In such a case, according to the opinion of AG Kokott, it is up to the 
policymakers to decide when it is appropriate to take action.143 The EU has 
the power to act on international issues in the manner it sees fit when there 
is an international institutional failure to act and an international agreement 
that it should be acted on exists. 
 
Since the EU ETS is an internal regulation, directed to the Member States, it 
is based on the internal competences found in article 191(2) TFEU. When 
interpreting 191(2) TFEU, an analysis of the reasoning of AG Kokott 
suggest that the article permits the EU to regulate emissions that do not 
occur within its territory, as long as the emissions affect the territory of the 
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Union.144 The Court contended itself to declare that a sufficient link exists 
when the regulated aircrafts are landing in or departing from a Member 
State, and hence are subjects to the full jurisdiction of that Member State.145  
 
The ECJ did, in this case, declare it legitimate of the EU to create internal 
environmental policies, based on internal competences, in order to address 
emission that occurs outside its territory. From an internal viewpoint, when 
an international institutional failure is at hand, the EU has the right to take 
unilateral action to address the issue. The Court thereby made structural 
leadership legal since it grants the EU active powers to act on behaviour that 
takes place outside its territory. The jurisdictional connection is the landing 
or departing of the aviation from EU territory. Another suggested 
jurisdictional connection is where the damage (the effects of the emissions) 
occurs, which is inside the EU’s territory. In the eyes of the Court, the EU 
ETS regulates internal matters, so the issue of extraterritoriality does not 
need to be addressed. 
 
The EU should promote international solutions to common problems, 
especially through the UN.146 This treaty obligation is probably one of the 
reasons why the ECJ stressed that the EU should only act when multilateral 
solutions have failed, and within the ambitions expressed in the UNFCCC. 
By conditioning the EU’s right to act on an internationally pronounced 
ambition to resolve the issue, the EU can still claim to act in line with the 
UN and the UNFCCC. 
 
The EU is also under another obligation besides promoting the environment 
and cooperate to solve common issues. According to article 3(3) TEU the 
EU is under an obligation to establish a ‘highly competitive social market 
economy’.147 Although the exact meaning of the obligation is unclear, it 
could serve as a justification for taking unilateral action in order to push the 
international community closer to the standards of the EU to safeguard the 
European economy. As discussed above the EU runs the risk of becoming 
an economic ‘loser,’ if it is the only one paying for the solution to a 
common problem. A more active leadership role, that tries to push and pull 
instead of only leading by example, could be motivated by economic 
concerns as well as environmental. Since creating a well functioning 
economy is an overall aim of the Union, structural environmental leadership 
could be internally justified for economic reasons. This is of course a bit of 
a stretch, but nevertheless interesting as it shows how the EU’s economic 
focus could be used as an argument in favour of the environment. 
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7.2 International Customary Law 
As already mentioned, the EU is bound by international customary law. 
Therefore, it is relevant to look at the international customary law that might 
effect the legality of the EU’s climate change mitigation. Here, the 
international principles that sets the boundaries for the EU’s right to 
legislate, or effect behaviour outside its territories, will be presented. 
 
The principal limits to the actions of a State, or the EU, are the respect for 
State sovereignty, and the principle of non intervention. These are two 
debated international norms, but the core is the right for each State to 
determine the law governing its territory without interference from other 
States.148 
 
The principle of state sovereignty says that all States are equal, and have the 
right to govern their own territory and the people living in that territory. The 
principle relates to jurisdictional competences, and is a part of customary 
international law.149 The principle of non-intervention limits a States 
possibility to exercise jurisdiction where another State has the exclusive 
jurisdiction according to the principle of State sovereignty.150  
 
However, a State can have the right to regulate conduct that takes place 
outside its territory but that have a substantial effect within its territory, if 
the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.151 One way of interfering in other 
States internal affairs is by creating an economic incentive for them to 
change their environmental policy by conditioning market access on 
products having a certain environmental standard.152 It has been argued that 
the EU is acting outside its jurisdiction when attempting to take unilateral 
action on climate change in such a manner.153 Clear examples of such 
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unilateral measures are the sustainability requirement in biofuels and the 
inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. 
 
The principle of territoriality does however only require a sufficient link 
between the territory of the State and the activity it is addressing.154 An 
Hertogen argues that sovereignty could be used to defend the EU’s extra 
territorial measures on climate change. Her understanding of sovereignty is 
that each State has the right to decide over its domestic affairs, including the 
quality of the environment within its territory. Using the inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS as an example, aviation emissions cause 
environmental problems outside the aircraft’s home-State, and the right to 
regulate these emissions does therefore not entirely fall within the home-
State. The EU should be able to regulate actions that need to be regulated to 
control the quality of its environment, especially when aircrafts are landing 
or taking off within its territory, thus creating a territorial link.155  
 
It has also been argued that when measures are applied to products that 
arrive in the EU, the measures should be considered wholly internal. 
Because the arrival of the products in the EU’s territory, thus its jurisdiction, 
creates a right for the EU to put demands on the way the products are 
produced. This line of reasoning argues that there are no extraterritorial 
elements to measures such as including imports to the EU ETS, because the 
measure is only applied to products within the EU. Thus, there is no 
jurisdictional conflict to consider.156 The reasoning is similar to what the 
ECJ says in the case concerning the EU ETS. The principle of sovereignty 
and the jurisdictional issue could, as we have seen, be used both as an 
argument for and against the EU’s right to regulate international emissions. 
 
A way to a justified unilateral action is through the duty of cooperation. The 
duty to cooperate is expressed in the Rio declaration article 12, and in article 
1 of the United Nations Charter. Although these instruments are non-
binding on the EU, the duty to cooperate is part of international customary 
law and thereby binding on the Union.157  
 
Multilateral solutions to international problems should be the rule and 
unilateral action the exception. Erich Vranes argues that unilateral action 
has to be balanced in the following way to be allowed: 
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‘In other words, unilateral state actions that address extraterritorial 
environmental concerns and may affect other countries’ legitimate interests 
have to be suitable to promote a legitimate environmental concern, 
necessary in the sense of constituting the mildest means of interference with 
the interests of these countries, and must be proportionate to the end 
pursued.’158 
 
The duty to cooperate and negotiate in good faith before taking unilateral 
measures, in an e contrario interpretation, could lead to the conclusion that 
when a country refuses to negotiate in good faith on a common 
environmental issue, unilateral measures are allowed.159 The ban of  certain 
CDM credits that the EU recently implemented could be seen as interfering 
with the non-intervention principle in an indirect way, since it regulates how 
projects in third countries should be constructed. On the other hand, the 
measure, could be considered allowed since international negotiations on 
banning certain CDM credits within the framework of UNFCCC has not 
yielded any results. 
 
By granting a year for international negotiations to move forward 
concerning regulation of emissions from international aviation, the EU is 
complying with the duty to cooperate. Since the inclusion of aviation in the 
EU ETS in the first place was based on inaction of the ICAO, the measure 
could also be considered justified as a response to other States failure to 
negotiate.  
 
When looking at the permissibility of a measure, it is necessary to 
differentiate between illegal coercion and legally creating an incentive. The 
measure also needs to be proportional and necessary to solve the issue it sets 
out to solve. As long as the EU stays on the right side of this line, its 
measures should not conflict with the State sovereignty principle, and the 
EU should be able to pursue more aggressive leadership alongside 
directional leadership. 
7.3 International Treaty Law 
There are two international legal regimes, which the EU is signatory to, that 
create the most important obstacles for the EU’s structural leadership on 
climate change issues. A presentation of the legal issues that might arise 
with the regimes because of the EU’s measures will follow. 
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7.3.1 UNFCCC 
The first regime is the international regime governing climate change, the 
UNFCCC. In the Kyoto protocol article 10 and in the UNFCCC article 3 it 
is clearly stated that all measures taken to combat climate change should 
respect the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities principle.160 Meaning basically that developing countries should 
not have to shoulder the same responsibility as developed countries because 
of their lack of historic contribution to the situation today, and because of 
their lack of economic capability.  
 
It has been argued that parties to the UNFCCC should respect the principle 
both when interpreting their obligations and when acting unilaterally.161 EU 
measures, such as the inclusion of aviation and the possible inclusion of 
imports to the EU ETS, do not differentiate between aircrafts or products 
originating from developing countries and this could be considered a breach 
of the common but differentiated principle.162  
 
The EU has argued, in its defence, that its measures are directed at 
businesses and not States, and therefore the principle is not applicable.163 
However, the EU ETS is in part concerned with the behaviour of States. The 
EU ETS allows for states who have a similar system to the EU, to be 
exempted from the EU ETS.164 So, although the measure is not directed at 
States, it creates incentives that are directed at States. 
7.3.2 WTO and GATT 
The second regime that is relevant to this analysis is the WTO, which is an 
organisation governing international trade with the aim of enabling free 
trade.165 Traditionally the WTO does not take environmental issues into 
consideration, it is first and foremost concerned with the promotion of free 
trade. However, the WTO rules have developed to allow for some 
environmental concerns.166  
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The most important rules governing trade measures are the Most-Favoured 
Nation principle, and the National Treatment principle. Article I in GATT 
expresses the MFN principle, stating that each WTO members ‘like’ 
products has the right to the same treatment as that of the most favoured 
member nation.167 Article III GATT contains the NT principle, obliging 
WTO members not to treat foreign products less favourable than domestic 
‘like’ products.168 There are however exceptions to these obligations which 
might be applicable to EU measures aimed at combating climate change. 
The exceptions related to environmental concerns are listed in article XX 
GATT: 
 
 ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures: 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption;’ 
 
A measure that qualifies under one of the exceptions must also fulfil the 
criteria in the chapeau, and not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination in order to be justified.169  
 
There is another exception to the MFN principle. Differentiated treatment, 
including lower tariffs, may be given a developing country according to the 
General System of Preferences. It is also possible to attach conditions to the 
receiving of the more favourable treatment, for example, a certain 
environmental standard.170 However, the EU is according differentiated 
treatment in the discussed measures based on climate action, not factoring in 
whether it is a developed or developing country. Therefore, the GSP can be 
used in the EU’s environmental policy but not as a justification of its 
unilateral measures. 
 
The observant reader has probably noticed the difficult situation in both 
respecting the principle of common but differentiated, and the MFN 
principle when using trade measures to address climate change issues. The 
UNFCCC requires a differentiated treatment based on origin, and the WTO 
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requires origin-neutral treatment.171 The Kyoto protocol does not allow for 
any express exceptions from the principle of common but differentiated and 
respective capabilities, although the exact meaning of the principle is 
debated. Trade measures respecting the common but differentiated principle 
would incorporate a differentiated treatment, and thus be in conflict with 
WTO law. In order to be justified, the measures would have to fall under 
one of the exceptions in the GATT, and be a measure either necessary to the 
protection of plant, animal or human life or health or relate to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
 
A problem that may arise with the current legislation on biofuels, and with 
the possible inclusion of imports in the EU ETS based on the carbon emitted 
during the production process, is that certain products will be treated 
differently based only on their production method. The question is, if two, 
otherwise exchangeable products, which only differ in the way they are 
produced would be considered ‘like’ products. If the products are not 
considered like, then differentiated treatment is allowed. To sum up, is 
difference in greenhouse gas emissions between products production 
process enough to make them ‘unlike’?172  
 
In determining likeness the AB has previously, although it is not bound by 
its jurisprudence, considered the physical proprieties of the product, the 
exchangeability of the product on the market, the international classification 
of the product and the perception of the product by the consumers. The AB 
will weigh together all factors when deciding upon likeness.173 If the 
consumer perception and preference have been manipulated they will not be 
considered.174 In the past, production method has not been accepted as 
grounds for differentiating products, but the Shrimp/Turtle case opened up 
for differentiation based on production methods, at least in relation to 
sustainability.175 However, relying only on production methods and 
consumer perception of the product does not present a strong case for 
considering products ‘unlike’, especially not since the consumer perception 
might be considered manipulated due to the fact that the Renewable 
Directive created the demand for biofuels produced with less carbon 
emissions. Differentiation between imported products and domestic 
products serving the same purpose, only based on the carbon produced 
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during their production, which would create an advantage for domestic 
producers or grant certain nations a more favourable treatment, would most 
likely not be allowed. 
 
Regarding bifofuels it is true that biofuels produced from palm oil, which is 
found outside the EU, naturally has a lower carbon saving percentage 
compared to rapeseed, which is grown inside the EU. Therefore, it is easier 
for European producers to match the requirements, giving them an 
advantage in the biofuel market. This could amount to a breach of the NT 
principle, even though domestic and foreign biofuels have to fulfil the same 
requirement.176 Including imported goods to the EU ETS could also amount 
to a breach of the NT principle, because domestic products would not be 
included since the domestic industry is already a part of the EU ETS, which 
could be considered an unfair advantage for the European industry.  
 
The inclusion of aviation into the EU ETS could also encounter issues with 
WTO law. At first sight, it seems to apply to all aircrafts in the same way. 
The measure does not treat domestic aircrafts different from international. 
However, it could run into problems with the MFN principle for two 
reasons. First, because the amount of allowances that an airplane has to give 
up is based on how far they travel, nations further away from the EU would 
have a greater cost than nations close by.177 Second, because countries who 
have enacted similar measures would be exempted, which would give them 
an advantage. The MFN principle is based on the concept that all WTO 
members should be accorded the same advantages.178  
 
The EU measures would, if found in breach with the WTO rules, have to 
fall under the exceptions in the GATT article XX in order to be legal. There 
is evidence that the EU is aware of this. The decision to give the ICAO a 
year to negotiate a multilateral solution could be interpreted as an attempt 
by the EU to show its willingness to negotiate, and thereby comply with the 
conditions in the chapeau. It would also be necessary to prove a genuine 
link between the measure and its protective purpose. 
 
The most important cases concerning the permissibility of unilateral 
measures with the purpose of preserving the environment are the 
Shrimp/Turtle cases.179 The background to the cases is the attempt made by 
                                                 
176 Stephanie Switzer, Joseph McMahon, ’EU Biofuels Policy- Raising the Question of 
WTO Compatabitlity’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 60 (2011), p 729. 
177 Lorand Bartels, ’The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS. WTO Law Considerations’, 
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179 WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (Shrimp/Turtle I), WT/DS58/AB/R (October 12, 1998) and Report of the 
Appellate Body, U.S. - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: 
Recourse to Article 21.5  of the DSU by Malaysia (Turtle/Shrimp II), WT/DS58/AB/RW 
(October 22, 2001). 
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the U.S. to ban the import of shrimps caught in a way that is harmful to sea-
turtles, granting an exception for countries that had a regulatory program to 
prevent harm to turtles comparable to the United States. This import ban 
was challenged as a trade restrictive measure, and the U.S. based their 
defence on GATT article XX(g), since the ‘relating to’ required in article 
XX(g) GATT is easier to prove than the ‘necessary’ required in article 
XX(b) GATT.180  
 
In these cases the AB made it clear: unilateral trade measures, taken in order 
to protect the global environment, which limits the market access of 
products based on how they are produced are not automatically unjustifiable 
under the chapeau in GATT article XX. If that was the case, article XX  
GATT would risk losing its purpose since many measures attempting to 
protect the environment are of this nature.181 This position was withheld in 
the two Shrimp/Turtles cases, and the AB has made it clear that it should be 
the guiding approach.182  
 
In the cases it is apparent that the measure is not weighed between its gain 
for the environment and its cost to trade. The AB only considers how well 
the measure fulfils its protective purpose.183  
 
The AB establishes that negotiations are not always required for an 
unilateral action to be justified, but not negotiating, and thereby not 
allowing flexibility for countries where different conditions prevail, could 
amount to unjust discrimination.184 WTO rules should be interpreted in 
accordance with prevailing international customary law.185 In accordance 
with international law and in particular the duty to cooperate, unilateralism 
should be avoided to the greatest extent possible, which also indicates that 
negotiations as an attempt to reach a multilateral conclusion is important in 
order to avoid failing the requirement in the chapeau.186 It is acceptable to 
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require ‘comparable’ policies for imports, as long as the requirement is 
reasonable, and gives other countries enough flexibility to solve the issue in 
the manner best suited to them.187 
 
The question whether the climate would qualify as an exhaustible natural 
resource, remains to be answered. Although it has not yet been confirmed, it 
is likely that it would. In the US-Gasoline case, clean air was considered an 
exhaustible national resource. The leap from clean air to climate is not 
long.188 If the climate is not considered an exhaustible natural resource, the 
measures could still be allowed under GATT article XX(b) as necessary to 
protect human or plant life or health. It would not be hard to prove that the 
measure is aimed at protection human or plant life or health since carbon 
emissions are harmful to nature and humans.  
 
The difficulty would lie in proving the measure necessary. To qualify as 
necessary, the measure should be the least trade restrictive possible, or 
otherwise justifiable under article XX GATT. The more important the issue 
the measure is addressing, the easier it will be for it to pass the necessity 
test. Since climate change is considered an important issue, it is possible 
that the EU measures would be able to pass the necessity test.189 It has also 
been suggested that the WTO, in face of the complexity of the issue of 
climate change, would be inclined to give countries a greater leeway on how 
they wish to regulate it.190  
 
It is clear that the unilateral measures, recently enacted by the EU, could 
face legal challenges from the WTO. However, it is not evident that these 
measures could not be justified under the exceptions in article XX GATT. 
Even so, the EU’s structural leadership remains limited by the WTO rules. 
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8 Conclusion 
This thesis has given account of the EU’s climate change leadership and the 
legal obstacles it could encounter. This thesis has shown that the EU’s 
leadership and measures are not only constructed with regards to EU law, 
but also to be accepted by the international community. Different legal 
regimes interact and influence the way the EU acts, and how it shapes its 
policy. The EU’s awareness of the requirements in international and WTO 
law influences the way the EU constructs its measures.  
  
This thesis has given evidence that the EU’s leadership to a great extent is 
directional. In order to uphold a credible leadership role, and to get 
negotiations going, the EU has enacted a large number of measures to 
regulate its own contribution to global warming. However, despite the fact 
that the EU has shown its ambition, the result of international negotiations 
has so far been disappointing.  
 
In the face of failure of the multilateral negotiations for a new binding 
agreement on emission cuts, the EU has adopted a more aggressive 
leadership style – structural leadership. The EU has the power required of a 
structural leader, mainly due to its strong economic position. The failure of 
the EU to engage other countries to act on climate change could have both 
environmental and economic consequences for the Union. Faced with 
challenges such as carbon leakage and competitive disadvantages, the EU 
has taken unilateral action.  
 
As a structural leader the EU has enacted measures such as including 
international aviation in the EU ETS, banning the use of certain CDM 
credits, creating a sustainability requirement for biofuels and is considering 
including imports in the EU ETS. These are measures intended to create 
incentive for more countries to start acting on climate change, and inject 
new energy to stagnant negotiations. They are also measures that protect the 
European economy, if European companies have more costly demands on 
them than companies in other countries the risk is that the European 
companies will end up with a competitive disadvantage or move abroad. 
These are all reasons why the EU is taking on structural leadership as well 
as directional. 
 
As we can see the reasons behind the EU’s leadership are not only 
environmental, indeed economic reasoning plays a big part. However, the 
EU needs to be careful when taking unilateral action so as not to construct 
them in a protectionist manner that would conflict with WTO rules.  
 
The possibilities for the EU to exercise leadership are limited not only by 
international law but also the institutional structure of the EU. Directional 
leadership mainly encounters issues because of the EU’s lack of 
competences to act in comparison with a State. The EU is also limited by 
the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. Furthermore, the unanimity 
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requirement for decisions concerning fiscal matters, or choice of energy 
source has the effect of, if not stopping the EU to legislate, at least of 
slowing down the process significantly. This relates to the issue that the EU 
consists of 27 Member States, each with an individual perspective on 
climate change. Internationally, the EU is at risk of being perceived as 
unclear in its ambitions if the Member States and the EU send mixed 
messages. Furthermore, if the measures are not being properly implemented 
by the Member States it is a problem for the credibility of the EU as a 
directional leader  
 
The EU is also bound by the competences set out in the treaties. This could 
be considered a limitation of its powers that undermines its leadership, but I 
believe it rather brings clarity to what the EU is trying to achieve. With the 
possibility the ECJ has to go beyond the meaning of the words and bestow 
implied powers on the EU this limitation should not be a great issue for 
directional leadership.  
 
With the integration article the EU is capable of taking a holistic grasp on 
the issue, it allows the EU to incorporate environmental concerns in all its 
policies. This is very important since the nature of the issue requires that it 
is addressed across different sectors and the EU has the tools to do so. An 
issue with the multi-sectored approach is that integrating environmental 
concerns into sectors that traditionally do not include environmental 
concerns could give rise to legal conflicts. The most clear case of this is of 
course the trade-environment debate which has been illustrated in this 
thesis.  
 
However, a holistic approach is a more realistic way of resolving the 
problem, and integrating environmental concerns to different sectors is 
probably going to continue and become more common. On the whole the 
institutional structure of the EU makes it both more complicated and more 
easy for the EU’s directional leadership. 
 
Structural leadership by the EU has been justified by the ECJ. Internal 
measures that regulate behaviour outside the EU have been accepted, as 
long as a territorial link exists and multilateral agreements are respected. 
The ECJ has opened up for the EU to take on a more aggressive leadership 
role in face of institutional failure of the international climate change 
regime.  
 
It should be remembered that the EU is under an obligation to safeguard its 
economy. The unilateral measures, intended to solve the problem of carbon 
leakage, could from an EU point of view be defended on the grounds that 
they are necessary in order to create a competitive market.  
 
The EU policy is also guided by the precautionary principle and the 
prevention principle. When faced with a problem such as climate change 
where acting now could prevent serious issues in the future the EU should, 
according to the treaties, act preventively.  
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It seems that the institutional structure of the EU could create some 
problems for the exercise of directional leadership since the EU is at risk of 
seeming inconsistent and unclear due to the shared competences with its 
Member States. However, the EU has lately been making its position more 
clear for instance by gaining a legal personality and clarifying how it 
negotiates. As for a structural leadership it seems as the EU has both the 
legal competences, and the economic power to successfully exercise such a 
leadership. The issues that might arise with the exercise of a structural 
leadership lies not with EU law, but in international law and treaty law. 
 
Legal obstacles in international law arises mainly for measures taken by a 
structural leader. Conflicts may arise around unilateral actions intended to 
create economic incentives, or to push negotiations forward. The question is 
if the EU’s unilateral measures that do create economic incentives and at 
times obligations, as is the case with the inclusion of aviation in the EU 
ETS, are in breach of the principle of State sovereignty and non-interference 
in international customary law.  
 
It has been argued that since the measures have a clear territorial link they 
should not be considered extraterritorial at all. Another argument is that in 
the principle of State sovereignty lies the right for the State to decide over 
what environmental quality it wishes to have within its territory, and the 
right to create regulations to maintain that desired quality. I believe that this 
argument is particularly strong in relation to climate change which could 
have devastating effects on a country. Some States risk ending up entirely 
under water and it seems reasonable that they should be allowed to create 
legislation in order to protect themselves. Therefore, using the location of 
the pollution as territorial link, as suggested by AG Kokott, should be 
sufficient.  
 
The limit to a permissible unilateral measure lies with the duty to cooperate. 
Before an unilateral action can be permissible there is an obligation to try 
and find a common solution to the problem. An e contrario  interpretation 
of the duty to cooperate could grant a State the right to act unilaterally when 
others refuse to negotiate a cooperation. However, I believe that such an 
interpretation would be going to far and invite unwanted consequences. A 
refusal of other nations to negotiate could however be one argument in 
favour of the justification of an unilateral action in a situation where no 
action would have irrevocably negative consequences, as is the case with 
climate change.  
 
Looking back at the initial discussion on permissible unilateral action we 
recognize the reasoning. In short, it is possible for the EU to overcome the 
legal obstacles in international law facing  structural leadership and this can 
be done by seeking directional leadership and multilateral solutions at the 
same time as exercising structural leadership. The EU seems to recognize 
this, a clear example is the one year the EU has accorded the ICAO to 
negotiate a multilateral scheme for the reduction of aviation emissions.  
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Another legal issue that might face the unilateral measures taken by the EU 
as a structural leader can be found in the UNFCCC and in the GATT. 
According to GATT the EU needs to respect the MFN and the NT 
principles; while UNFCCC requires the respect of the common but 
differentiated and respective capabilities principle. One of the main issues is 
that the common but differentiated principle which requires differentiated 
treatment between developed and less developed countries, and the MFN 
principle requiring the same treatment of all WTO member nations, seems 
to be in direct conflict with each other. In order for the EU’s measures to be 
compatible with both at the same time they would either have to comply 
with the MFN, and then rely on an interpretation of the common but 
differentiated principle that makes them justified; or the measures could 
respect the common but differentiated principle, be in breach of the MFN 
principle, but fall under one of the exceptions in article XX GATT. 
 
So far, the EU seems to be attempting both ways of justifying its measures. 
A possible, ‘EU-friendly,’ interpretation of the common but differentiated 
principle could be that the measures applies to foreign business, and the 
principle is only directed to States. For a permissible breach of the MFN and 
NT principles, the EU would have to show that the measures are intended to 
preserve the climate, and that the climate is an exhaustible natural resource. 
It is an open discussion whether the EU measures aiming at protecting the 
climate would fall under the exceptions in article XX GATT.  
 
Considering the gravity of the issue of climate change, and the cross-sector 
approach that is necessary to address it, the EU might be granted leeway in 
its search for a solution. The fact that the WTO traditionally is not 
concerned with the environment could actually be an advantage since the 
WTO would be reluctant to dictate how a State, or the EU, should create its 
environmental policy. Until ruled on in court, it is impossible to give a finite 
answer to whether the measures can be challenged. 
 
The conclusion to draw from this thesis seems to be that the EU faces legal 
challenges when shaping a leadership that is a combination of directional 
and structural, but that it is possible to legally pursue climate change 
leadership.  
 
However, this thesis is limited to the most pressing challenges for the EU’s 
measures. In order to have a full account of the legality of the EU’s climate 
change leadership, other legal sources need to be considered. It is also a fact 
that no definite answer to the legality of the EU’s measures can be given 
here.  
 
Nevertheless, the issue of climate change is here to stay, and in view of the 
possibly devastating consequences, solutions needs to be found. Therefore, 
international and EU climate law is still evolving and most likely evolving 
to give more room for solutions. Organisations as the WTO is beginning to 
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realise the necessity of making it possible for States to create climate 
policies.  
 
The EU is pushing legal boundaries when developing its leadership, and 
probably participates in the development of new customary international 
law. As stated in the beginning of this thesis, climate change is an issue that 
transcends almost the entire society and any response to it needs to do the 
same. Climate change concerns need to be integrated in all levels of 
regulation, and traditional jurisdictional limits perhaps need to be 
reconsidered. The multi-level efforts by the EU is probably the only way 
forward and therefore it will become, if it is not already, legally justified. 
The question of whether the EU’s efforts will be enough is however a topic 
for another thesis. 
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Supplement A 
Table of Measures 
 
 
Measures 
 
 
Legislation 
 
Year 
Greenhouse gas Monitoring 
and Reporting 
”Monitoring Mechanism 
Decision” 
Implementing the Kyoto 
protocol requirement for 
reporting 
And monitoring their progress. 
 
 
 
DECISION No 280/2004/EC 
OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 11 
February 2004 concerning a 
mechanism for monitoring 
Community greenhouse gas 
emissions and for 
implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol 
 
2004 
 
 
Emission Trading 
EU ETS 
Emission Trading System for 
industries in the EU. 
Including international aviation 
 
DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the 
Community and 
amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC 
 
Amended by: 
 
DIRECTIVE 2004/101/EC 
OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 27 October 2004 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC 
establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of the 
Kyoto Protocol’s project 
mechanisms 
 
DIRECTIVE 2008/101/EC 
OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to include 
aviation activities in the 
scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading 
2003, 2004, 2008, 2009 
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within the Community 
 
REGULATION (EC) No 
219/2009 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 11 March 2009 adapting a 
number of instruments 
subject to the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 of 
the Treaty to 
Council Decision 
1999/468/EC with regard to 
the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny 
 
DIRECTIVE 2009/29/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 23 April 2009 
amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve 
and extend the greenhouse 
gas emission allowance 
trading scheme of the 
Community 
 
Effort Sharing Decision 
”Effort Sharing Decision” 
Decision on how much each 
Member State has to reduce its 
emissions in order to reach the 
collective reduction target. 
Also tasking the Commission 
with including shipping in the 
EU ETS if no international 
agreement accounting for 
international maritime emission 
in its reduction targets is 
concluded by 31 December 
2011.  
 
DECISION  No 406/2009/EC 
OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 23 April 
2009 on the effort of Member 
States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to 
meet the Community’s 
greenhouse gas emission 
reduction commitments up to 
2020 
 
2009 
Carbon Capture and Storage 
“CCS Directive” 
Directive on site requirement 
for environmentally safe 
geological storing of carbon 
dioxide. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2009/31/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 23 April 2009 on the 
geological storage of carbon 
dioxide and amending 
Council Directive 
85/337/EEC, European 
Parliament and Council 
Directives 2000/60/EC, 
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 
2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 
1013/2006 
 
2009 
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Transports and Fuels 
“Passenger Car Regulation” 
Regulation setting binding 
emission targets for new 
passenger cars. 
 
 
REGULATION (EC) No 
443/2009 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
23April 2009 setting 
emission performance 
standards for new passenger 
cars as part of the 
Community’s integrated 
approach to reduce CO2 
emissions from light-duty 
vehicles 
 
 
2009 
“Regulation on emissions from 
commercial vehicles”* 
Regulation setting binding 
emission targets for new light 
commercial vehicles. 
 
REGULATION (EU) No 
510/2011 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
11 May 2011 setting 
emission performance 
standards for new light 
commercial vehicles as part 
of the Union's integrated 
approach to reduce CO 2 
emissions from light-duty 
vehicles  
 
2011 
“Regulation on CO2 labelling 
of cars” 
Regulation requiring Member 
States to provide information on 
new cars emission to 
consumers, including a cars fuel 
efficiency and its CO2 
emissions. 
 
DIRECTIVE 1999/94/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 13 December 1999 relating 
to the availability of 
consumer information on fuel 
economy and CO2 emissions 
in respect of the marketing of 
new passenger cars 
 
1999 
“Fuel Quality Directive” 
Directive requiring a 10% 
decrease in greenhouse gas 
intensity of fuels used in 
vehicles. Including petrol, gas-
oil, diesel and biofuels. 
 
DIRECTIVE 98/70/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 13 October 1998 relating 
to the quality of petrol and 
diesel fuels and amending 
Council Directive 93/12/EEC 
 
Amended by: 
 
DIRECTIVE 2009/30/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 23 April 2009 amending 
Directive 98/70/EC as 
regards the specification of 
petrol, diesel and gas-oil and 
introducing a mechanism to 
1998, 2009 
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monitor and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and 
amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the 
specification of fuel used by 
inland waterway vessels and 
repealing Directive 
93/12/EEC 
 
Ozone Layer Protection 
“Regulation on Substance that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer” 
Regulation requiring licensing 
for import, export, and 
production of products for 
ozone depleting substances. 
REGULATION (EC) No 
1005/2009 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
16 September 2009 on 
substances that deplete the 
ozone layer 
 
Amended by: 
 
 COMMISSION 
REGULATION (EU) No 
744/2010 of 18 August 2010  
amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1005/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council on substances 
that deplete the ozone layer, 
with regard to the critical 
uses of halons  
 
2009 
Fluorinated Gases 
“MAC directive” 
Directive that prohibits the use 
of F-gases with 150 greater 
potential then CO2 for global 
warming in all new types of 
vans and cars from 2011 and in 
all new vans and cars from 
2017. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2006/40/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 17 May 2006 relating to 
emissions from air-
conditioning systems in 
motor vehicles and amending 
Council Directive 
70/156/EEC 
 
2006 
“F-gas Regulation” 
Regulation on preventing risk 
for leakage of f-gases from 
equipment and avoidance of the 
use of f-gases where suitable 
replacement exists. 
 
 
REGULATION (EC) No 
842/2006 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
17 May 2006 on certain 
fluorinated greenhouse gases 
 
2006 
 
Air Quality 
“Framework Air Quality 
Directive”* 
Directive creating a strategy for 
creating and maintaining good 
ambient air quality, assessing 
air quality and establish 
objectives for air quality. 
 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
96/62/EC of 27 September 
1996 on ambient air quality 
assessment and management 
 
1996 
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Energy 
“Renewable Directive” 
Directive prescribing an 
augmentation of 20% of the use 
of renewable energy in all 
sectors and a 10% augmentation 
in the transport sector by 2020. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL 
of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable 
sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC 
2009 
Buildings 
“Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive” 
Directive demanding among 
other tings all new buildings to 
be nearly-zero in energy 
consumption by 2020. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2010/31/EU OF 
THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 19 May 
2010 on the energy 
performance of buildings 
(recast)  
Supplemented by:  
 
COMMISSION 
DELEGATED 
REGULATION (EU) No 
244/2012 of 16 January 2012 
supplementing Directive 
2010/31/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
on the energy performance of 
buildings by establishing a 
comparative methodology 
framework for calculating 
cost-optimal levels of 
minimum energy 
performance requirements for 
buildings and building 
elements  
2010 
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